

Exploring Secular Factors for the Lack of Violent Muslim Radicals in Indonesia

A Monograph

by

MAJ Christopher A. Bolz, P.E.
US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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Name of Candidate: MAJ Christopher A. Bolz, P.E.

Monograph Title: Exploring Secular Factors for the Lack of Violent Muslim Radicals in Indonesia

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director

Daniel G. Cox, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader

Eric Laforest, Col

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies

James C. Markert, COL

Accepted this 25th day of May 2017 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs

Prisco R. Hernandez, PhD

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Abstract

Exploring Secular Factors for the Lack of Violent Muslim Radicals in Indonesia, by MAJ Christopher A. Bolz, P.E., 60 pages.

The effects of violent Muslim radicals have risen over the past fifteen years. Once geographically isolated, extremist violence has spread to affect every nation. This study examines why Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim country, has low participation rates in violent Muslim radical groups. This study creates a radicalization index to account for extremist event data and population size. It then compares countries across a wide variety of secular factors: population demographics, employment levels, economy, poverty rate, national social assistance, level of governance, protection of rights, and travel distance to Iraq and Syria. Most radical country's citizens are educated, unemployed, live above the poverty line, and have high social assistance. The least radical counties have a large GDP, high poverty, and must travel the greatest distance to participate in jihad in Iraq and Syria. Additionally, this study found and explored many statistical similarities between Tunisia (one of the most radical countries) and Indonesia (one of the least radical countries). This study concludes that Indonesia may in fact be more radical but its citizens are relatively poor and the physical and financial barriers prevent their participation in violent Muslim radical groups. As countries develop and bring larger numbers of their population out of poverty, they must be aware of social currents and sentiments lest they enable and mobilize future extremists.

Contents

Acknowledgement	v
Acronyms	vi
Tables	viii
Introduction	1
Literature Review	2
Radicals	3
What it Means to be a Muslim	6
Violent Muslim Radicals	7
Terrorists and Foreign Fighters.....	10
Culture and History.....	12
Methodology.....	14
Statistical Analysis.....	16
Radical Measures.....	16
Population Demographics	22
Employment	27
Economy	30
Poverty, Social Assistance, and Quality of Life	34
Governance.....	38
Voice and Rights	48
Corruption	53
Compliance	57
Travel to Jihad.....	60
Summary	62
Conclusion.....	65

Appendix 68

Bibliography 70

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Acronyms

ASPIRE	Atlas of Social Protection: Indicators of Resilience and Equality
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
F	Free
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTD	Global Terrorism Database
GTI	Global Terrorism Index
HDI	Human Development Index
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILOSTAT	International Labour Organization Department of Statistics
ISIS	Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
NF	Not Free
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
PF	Partially Free
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
START	Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UCDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program
WDI	World Development Index
WGI	Worldwide Governance Indicators

Tables

1.	Radical Index.....	19
2.	Population Demographics.....	23
3.	Employment Factors	28
4.	Economic Factors	31
5.	Poverty, Social Assistance, and Quality of Life	35
6.	Type of State	40
7.	Governance Indicators.....	43
8.	State Fragility	46
9.	Political Rights and Civil Liberties	48
10.	Freedom of the Press.....	52
11.	Corruption Data	55
12.	Tax Compliance and Travel Distances.....	59

Introduction

Events of the past fifteen years have brought the culture and tradition of Islam to the forefront of American and academic thought. As the world becomes more globalized and interconnected, the need to understand other cultures increases. The alienness of Islam to some presents a significant barrier. Lack of understanding about the religion and the wide variance in practices makes the uninitiated cling to gross biases. While Islam is the religion of peace through submission to God, there are some of that faith that violently seek to make everyone on earth submit.

Violent Muslim radicals are not a new phenomenon. The clash of civilizations and ideologies has existed since Islam moved off the Arabian Peninsula.¹ This point was re-emphasized after the 9/11 attacks. There are 1.2 billion Muslims in the world. The Muslim and non-Muslim world has to coexist and can rise together.

Radicals come in all shapes and ideologies. At one point in time Martin Luther, Thomas Jefferson, and Mahatma Gandhi were considered radicals. Today, Ted Kaczynski, Osama bin Laden, and al-Zarqawi were modern radicals. There are also violent radicals in feminist, environmental, and social movements. The past had radicals, the present has radicals, and the future will have violent radicals.

Contemporary events have provided a new focus on radicalism. Atrocities committed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have shocked the world at large and galvanized suspicion

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 212.

and hatred towards Muslims.² ISIS lone-wolf attacks have instilled a fear that violent Muslim radicals will spread. While ISIS will not dominate the Earth, it does provide an impetus to decipher what environmental factors contribute to radicalism. Much research has been conducted on why individuals join radical movements, but few studies have examined socio-demographic factors that contribute to radical groups.

Indonesia is the most populous Muslim country yet suffers very little from terrorism and contributes relatively few individuals to violent Muslim radical movements. Some have put forth that Indonesia is not radical because it is an island nation and enjoys a different form of Islam than the fiery variant that permeates the Levant.³

This study finds these cultural explanations unsatisfactory and seeks to identify which secular and socio-demographic factors contribute to Indonesia's lack of violent Muslim radicals. Volumes of data have been analyzed as no data point should be considered in isolation. In examining complex human problems, many factors contribute to an explanation and this study believes that a holistic justification is more suitable. This study is not all inclusive nor definitive; many additional databases and indices can be included in future works in order to further academic understanding. Several tables and additional resources are presented so the reader can further their own study of radicalism with respect to secular indicators.

Literature Review

² Todd H. Green, *The Fear of Islam: An Introduction to Islamophobia in the West* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015), 121.

³ Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 12.

Radicals

Radicals exist in many social movements, from Marxists to Muslims, and understanding what embodies a Muslim radical can be hard to define. Differentiating between a radical, an activist, and an Islamist is also problematic. Radicals present a wide array of social variance. This study narrowly focuses on violent Muslim radicals. This is primarily due to the propensity of these radicals to engage in terrorism and violence towards civilians.

Many definitions of “radical” exist in the social field. Renowned social theorist Max Weber unwieldily described a radical as one who differs from “the socially sanctioned outlook of common sense.”⁴ However, this definition is too broad to be of any practical use. In her 1950 study of radicals, Thelma McCormack defined radicals broadly as “persons who advocate institutional change.”⁵ Horace Kallen adds that radicals’ attitude “envisage the entire complex of a society or a culture...expand in scope until [its] field is coincident with the entire setup of a society” and “looking toward systematic destruction of what is hated, and its replacement by an art, a faith, a science or a society logically demonstrated as true and good.”⁶ More recently, Egon Bittner’s research goes further by observing that radicalism rejects the “ordinary, traditionally sanctioned world-view.”⁷ While this is helpful, the editors of the *Journal for the Study of Racism* further refine radical as “distinguished from ‘reformers,’ to mean groups who seek revolutionary

⁴ Egon Bittner, “Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements,” *American Sociological Review* 28, no. 6 (December 1963): 928.

⁵ Thelma McCormack, “The Motivation of Radicals,” *American Journal of Sociology* 56, no. 1 (July 1950): 17.

⁶ Bittner, “Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements,” 929.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 929.

alternatives to hegemonic social and political institutions, and who use violent or non-violent means to resist authority and to bring about change.”⁸ Finally in another contemporary study, Snow and Cross define “a radical as a social movement activist who embraces direct action and high-risk options, often including violence against others, to achieve a stated goal.”⁹ From this brief survey one can see that simply settling on a working definition of “radical” is problematic.

Many of these definitions are unsatisfying in their all-encompassing nature but they offer some guidelines which this study will use to arrive at a working definition of radicals. Radicals may exist in any movement: environmental, religious, political, and ethnic organizations. Radicals make the decision to move beyond activism to action. They determine that the political path is not legitimate or fast enough to achieve their goals. Radicals also appear uncompromising and extreme in their views. Bittner points out that radicals “seek a unified and internally consistent interpretation of the meaning of the world” and have a “strong concern with purity of belief.”¹⁰

To like-minded activists, “radicals are admired for their dedication and courage, often risking bodily harm or imprisonment.”¹¹ Conversely, they are also “reviled for their confrontational and often violent tactics.”¹² A broad spectrum of engagement exists within a movement. In this

⁸ Arthur Versluis, “The Journal for the Study of Radicalism,” Michigan State University Press, accessed September 14, 2016, <http://msupress.org/journals/jsr/>.

⁹ Remy Cross and David A. Snow, “Radicalism within the Context of Social Movements: Processes and Types,” *Journal of Strategic Security* 4, no. 4 (Winter 2011), 118.

¹⁰ Bittner, “Radicalism and the Organization of Radical Movements,” 932, 933.

¹¹ Cross and Snow, “Radicalism within the Context of Social Movements,” 116.

¹² *Ibid.*, 116.

sense, the distinction between activist, radical supporter, and radical actor become muddled. It is difficult to distinguish between one who advocates or supports violence and one who acts.

Using the above theorists and concepts, a working understanding of “radical” emerges. Radicals’ vision of the social and political world is different from the current state. They seek institutional change through action. They differ from activists who rely on legitimate actions and processes. This divergence actively precipitates into violence. This study focuses on the violent Muslim radical and requires a more manageable definition. For the purpose of this research endeavor, *a violent radical is one who seeks institutional change through violence.*

Radical Islamism is also not a clear phenomenon. The above confusion between activist and radical permeates into differentiating between Muslim propensities. Goli and Rezaei’s research sheds needed light on these nuances. Their study divides Muslims into five broad categories: secular, fundamentalists, rebellious, Islamists, and radical Muslims. Secular Muslims “do not think that Islamic identity, whatever that might mean, is to be considered as a social[ly] relevant role.”¹³ They identify as being Muslim but do not believe Islam should define society. Fundamentalists “associate themselves with an interpretation of Islam as a peaceful religion oriented towards changing the individual and civil society in an Islamic manner.”¹⁴ Here fundamentalists conservatively practice Islam, and want society to reflect the religion’s principles. Islam affects their values and behaviors but does not manifest in a physical way.¹⁵ The rebellious

¹³ Marco Goli and Shahamak Rezaei, *House of War: Islamic Radicalisation in Denmark* (Denmark: Aarhus University, 2010), 34, accessed September 14, 2016, http://cir.au.dk/fileadmin/site_files/filer_statskundskab/subsites/cir/Rapport_2FINAL.pdf.

¹⁴ Goli and Rezaei, *House of War*, 35.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 129.

are simply hostile to the current society's goals and use Islam as a vehicle to enact change yet not bother "to act in accordance with Sharia and Islamic values."¹⁶ Goli and Rezaei make important and necessary distinctions between Islamists and radical Muslims; "Islamists are those who work for the establishment of an Islamic society and Islamic government by lawful means and do not submit to hostile attitudes toward society."¹⁷ In contrast, radicals do not differentiate between legitimate and illegitimate means and find violent action as acceptable. Therefore, fundamentalist does not mean Islamists, as Islamist does not equate to being a radical. Islamists tend to be reformers. Goli and Rezaei's survey illuminates these nuances.

What It Means to Be a Muslim

Simply understanding what it means to be a Muslim is perplexing. Islam has five religious obligations: pronouncement of *al-shahada* (there is no god but Allah and his messenger is Muhammad), prayer five times a day, fasting during the holy month of Ramadan, offering *zakat* (alms), and conducting the hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca.¹⁸ Muslims conform to these requirements to varying degrees. Islam is not just a religion, but a way of life. The holy Quran and *hadiths*, Muhammad's words and actions, shape Sharia or how a Muslim should live their life. In the West, there is an apparent misconception about Sharia and its importance to Muslims. Sharia is not just Islamic law; it is the guidance of Allah. To a Muslim, Sharia permeates all realms of man: religious, moral, political, social, economic, and more. For Muslims, Sharia encompasses all things and is not

¹⁶ Ibid., 129.

¹⁷ Ibid., 35.

¹⁸ Giora Eliraz, *Islam in Indonesia: Modernism, Radicalism, and the Middle East Dimension* (Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2004), 73.

just a set of ancient rules that must be followed, but is the path of Allah and imparted by his last prophet Muhammad. This understanding is important in relation to Muslims and their view of Sharia. A Muslim advocating the inclusion of Sharia into society does not make him a radical. Asking a Muslim if Sharia is important is akin to asking a Christian if Jesus is important; both would probably gape at your ignorance.

The tenant that Sharia encompasses all aspects of life must be considered when examining the 2012 Pew survey of Muslims' views across the globe. This study is extremely helpful in understanding what Muslims think of Islam and its role. In 17 of the 23 countries surveyed, over half believed that Sharia is the revealed word of God.¹⁹ Of the Muslims surveyed, except for those in Central Asia and Southeast Europe, most agreed that Sharia should be the law of the land.²⁰ This is congruent with the understanding that Sharia permeates all aspects of Muslim life. Yet when asked if Sharia should apply to all citizens regardless of religion, most rejected this notion. In less than 20 percent of countries surveyed, over half of the respondents think Sharia should apply to non-Muslims.²¹ Overall, less than a third take this view. Therefore, a Muslim's desire to live under Sharia does not make them a radical, it makes them a Muslim.

Violent Muslim Radicals

When dealing with these nuances, differentiating between a violent Muslim radical and an Islamist or fundamentalist can be tricky. Especially when concerning application of Sharia as

¹⁹ *The World's Muslims: Religion, Politics and Society* (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2013), 42, accessed September 14, 2016, <http://www.pewforum.org/files/2013/04/worlds-muslims-religion-politics-society-full-report.pdf>.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 46.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 48.

explored above. Goli and Rezaei conducted a survey of Muslims to establish a baseline of radical Muslims in Denmark. While they were concerned about socioeconomic factors along with density and education in their country's Muslim population, they were also concerned about Muslim's views. They found that Muslim radicals knew more about religion, incorporated it more deeply in their lives, were more concerned about Muslims in global politics, and specifically knew more about jihad and the apocalypse.²² This included knowledge of the battle of *Badr* where Allah sent 10,000 angels to help the mujahidin defeat a larger infidel army and the concept of *Dar-ul-Harb* which demarcates the world into areas of war and peace or non-Muslim and Muslim.²³ Yet knowledge about these religious particulars and concern for the greater ummah (cross-ethnic transnational Muslim community) on the global stage does not make one a radical. In another study, the vast majority of Muslims empathize with the global ummah.²⁴

²² Goli and Rezaei, *House of War*, 55.

²³ *Ibid.*, 51.

²⁴ Quintan Wiktorowicz, *Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005), 110.

Through their questionnaire, Goli and Rezaei were able to narrowly define a violent Muslim radical through four requirements:

1. Advocate for Islam as a religious ideology.
2. Join the interpretation of Islam as holistic, distinguishing between true and false Islam, acknowledging Islam as binding prescription for activities in *Din* [Religion], *Dunya* [Way of life] and *Dawla* [Government].
3. Submit the idea that the final goal of Islam is to conquest the entire world.
4. Agree that fulfilling that end legitimises the use of any means, including violence.²⁵

This delineation, specifically the use of violence, adequately defines violent Muslim radicals.

This study will further narrow the definition to specify violence against civilians. Civilians are not legitimate military targets and are protected by the Geneva and Hague conventions. Terrorists routinely kill or target civilians. Bruce Hoffman notes that when armed forces target civilians, it is called a “war crime” and actors face legal ramifications. He goes on to note that “one of the fundamental *raisons d’être* of international terrorism is the refusal to be bound by such rules of warfare and codes of conduct.”²⁶ The indiscriminate use of violence against civilians separates terrorists and radicals from legitimate secessionists or freedom fighters.

Using the above lens, it is easier to distinguish between a violent Muslim radical, a fundamentalist, and a reforming Islamist. The major concern about violent Muslim radicals is the ease at which they become active in terrorism and kill civilians. While Goli and Rezaei dissect the nuances between radicals and those who passively and actively support their cause or hold similar

²⁵ Goli and Rezaei, *House of War*, 42.

²⁶ Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 35.

worldviews, it is the transition to terrorism that is most concerning. This shift precipitates in targeting civilians, killing government employees, becoming a foreign fighter, bombings, suicide bombings, and convincing or employing others to do the above. Many jihadists consistently use “unwilling martyrs” to conduct suicide bombings or attacks.²⁷ It is not the radical thought that threatens governments and societies, but the radical action that puts people at risk.

Terrorists and Foreign Fighters

Determining and evaluating who and who is not a violent Muslim radical is difficult. In Goli and Rezaei’s research they found 5.6% of Muslims in Denmark express radical Islamic views.²⁸ Views do not mean action or even evolve into explicit support. While this figure is intriguing, it does not lend itself to analyzing larger systems. What is measureable are the effects of violent Muslim radicals in the realm of terrorist acts and foreign fighter flow. While these statistics do not reveal the number of radicals in a population or the active support radical Muslim movements receive, most concerning are the effects. This research is limited to violent Muslim radicals.

Again, simply defining the term terrorist can be trying. Bruce Hoffman adds clarity to an overused term. He describes a terrorist as a fundamentally violent intellectual who: has political aims, uses or threatens to use violence, commits acts designed to have far reaching psychological effects, and conducted by a hierarchical yet ununiformed organization or non-state entity.²⁹ He makes several key points that discriminates terrorists from criminals: political motivation and

²⁷ Emile Simpson, *War from the Ground Up: Twenty-First-Century Combat as Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 50.

²⁸ Goli and Rezaei, *House of War*, 50.

²⁹ Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism*, 43.

hierarchy. Overlaying this definition with the concept of a radical, action separates the two. While Hoffman's definition is pleasing, the Institute of Economics and Peace uses a broader definition for the data used throughout the rest of this research. Their Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation."³⁰ This definition is used to measure the *effects* of violent Muslim radicals.

Additionally, foreign fighter flow presents another method of measuring violent Muslim radicals. The United Nations defines foreign fighters as "nationals [or] other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict."³¹ While this world body provides an all-encompassing definition, Jahangir Arasli notes that "a foreign Islamist fighter is a volunteer combatant actor with no apparent link to the area of the ongoing armed conflict yet bound to it by his sense of the perceived Muslim religious duty."³² This latter definition helps highlight the relationship between foreign fighters and violent Muslim radicals.

³⁰ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015* (New York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015), 6, accessed September 14, 2016, <http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf>.

³¹ Thomas Koruth Samuel, *Radicalisation in Southeast Asia: A Selected Case Study of Daesh in Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines* (Kuala Lumpur: The Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, 2016), 9.

³² *Ibid.*, 8.

Every year the Global Terrorism Index ranks each country on how it is impacted by terrorism. Indonesia ranks 33, two places above the United States.³³ Unsurprisingly Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria are the five countries most affected by terrorism. Just under half of Nigerians are Muslim; in the other four countries, Muslims account for over 90% of the citizens.³⁴ Of the next five countries most effected by terrorism, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya citizens are virtually all Muslim, India has the second largest Muslim population in the world, and Thailand's terrorist activity is overwhelming confined to the southern Muslim separatists.³⁵ In Indonesia, 87.2% of its 240 million citizens are Muslim; it's Muslim population is over three quarters the entire Muslim population in the Middle East. This begs the question, why is Indonesia, the most populated Muslim country in the world, less violent?

Culture and History

Many researchers attribute Indonesia's lack of radical violence to its culture and history. Indonesia as a vast archipelago, was a collection of sea-faring, trading sultanates in the Indic tradition.³⁶ Even *Bahasa*, the national language, is a trader's tongue. While Islam was introduced to Indonesia in the eighth century, it did not take hold until the beginning of the thirteenth century.³⁷ Islam spread to Indonesia from India by merchants and established along international

³³ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, 10.

³⁴ *Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050* [database online] (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center, 2015), accessed September 14, 2016, http://www.pewforum.org/files/2015/04/Religious_Composition_by_Country_2010-2050.xlsx.

³⁵ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, 29.

³⁶ Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 11.

³⁷ William H. Frederick and Robert L. Worden, eds., *Indonesia: A Country Study*, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, 2011), 16.

trading routes.³⁸ Clifford Geertz claims, “in Indonesia Islam did not construct a civilization, it appropriated one.”³⁹ The Javanese and Malay sultans presided over 300 ethnic groups and thus had to exercise a large degree of cultural pluralism.⁴⁰ Islam’s origins in these islands was one of incorporation. Here, Islam spread through commerce, not by the sword as from Iberia to the Indian subcontinent. Robert Kaplan describes further that “Islam seeped gradually into Indonesia over the course of hundreds of years of business and cultural interchanges, replete with paganistic Sufi influences.”⁴¹ Because of Islam’s indirect path through India by merchants looking to trade with, not overthrow existing powers, the religion incorporated many of the existing Hindu, Buddhist, and animist practices.⁴² This leads Kaplan to describe the Muslim faith in Indonesia as “tropical Islam.”⁴³ Islam in Indonesia historically and culturally has been one of acceptance and inclusion. This leads to this study’s first major hypothesis: Muslims in Indonesia are less radical for secular reasons.

This study was inspired by Robert Kaplan’s *Monsoon* and the dissatisfaction that history and culture explain Indonesia’s lack of violence.⁴⁴ While culture and history in Indonesia are very important and should not be overlooked, there is more to the story. Indonesia’s geography and

³⁸ Robert D. Kaplan, *Monsoon: The India Ocean and the Future of American Power* (New York: Random House, 2010), 244.

³⁹ Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 11.

⁴⁰ Robert Hefner, *Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 14.

⁴¹ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 244.

⁴² Max Gross, *A Muslim Archipelago: Islam and Politics in Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007), 7.

⁴³ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 241.

⁴⁴ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 244.

distance to Mecca is an aspect. The country's economic resources, population density, and system of government are also crucial factors. These elements can provide a deeper understanding as to why one of the largest and densest Muslim populations remains peaceful and provides potential mechanisms to be exported or to ensure that Indonesia remains so.

Methodology

This study used numerous indices and databases to explore which secular factors are associated with less radical populations; a list of databases is presented in the Appendix. First, this study developed a radicalization index in order to compare one country to the next. This was needed because a methodology did not exist to compare radicalism participation rates between countries nor do terrorism indexes control for population size. The radicalization index consisted of calculating the raw Global Terrorism Index score, a factored number of terrorism events from 1970 to 2000, the number of terrorism events from 2001 to 2015, and the number of Foreign Fighters divided by the country's total population.⁴⁵ This number was multiplied by 170,000 in order to produce numbers greater than one. The START database provided the number of terrorism events, The Soufan Group produced foreign fighter flow numbers, and the Pew Research Center determined population data.⁴⁶ This formula is presented in the Radical Index equation

⁴⁵ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, 96.

⁴⁶ *Global Terrorism Database* [database online] (College Park, MD: University of Maryland, National Consortium of the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2016) accessed August 15, 2016, <https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/>; *Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq* (New York: The Soufan Group, December 2015) 7-10, accessed August 18, 2016 from <http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters/>; *Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050* [database online].

below. The resulting Radical Index scale ranged from 0 to 302.2 with Iraq having the most radical population.

$$\text{Radical Index} = \frac{e^{\text{GTI} \cdot 1.535} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Events}_{(1970 \text{ to } 2000)} + \text{Events}_{(2001 \text{ to } 2015)} + \text{Foreign Fighters}}{\text{Population}} \cdot 170000$$

After developing the Radical Index, this study limited its scope to the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation countries in Southeast Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East.⁴⁷ The majority of the world's Muslims live in these regions and they contribute the most manpower to violent Muslim radical groups.⁴⁸ This study then used data from the Armed Conflict Dataset to remove those countries that faced conflicts in the past four of five years.⁴⁹ This study excluded countries with ongoing conflicts due to the inability to distinguish between violent radical acts and insurgent attacks. This narrowed the list to eighteen: Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Maldives, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.

Once this target list of countries was devised, two logical cutoff points emerged on the Radical Index. The least radical countries had a score of less than two, while the most radical countries scored over forty. Countries scoring less than two became the least radical band, while countries scoring over forty were in the most radical band. This study began reviewing numerous

⁴⁷ "Member States," Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, accessed September 11, 2016, <http://www.oic-oci.org/states/?lan=en>.

⁴⁸ Hardin Lang and Muath Al Wari, "The Flow of Foreign Fighters to the Islamic State: Assessing the Challenge and the Response," Center for American Progress (March 2016), 6.

⁴⁹ *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016* [database online] (Uppsala, Sweden: Uppsala Universitet, 2016), accessed September 17, 2016, <http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdprio/ucdp-prio-acd-4-2016.xlsx>.

datasets in order to determine secular factors that would contribute to radicalization. A direct correlation between the Radical Index and any demographic did not readily appear. This study did observe correlations between a band's weighted average, based on population, and the demographic in question. The weighted average for each demographic was compared for both the least radical band and the most radical band. The study began with this methodology in mind.

Statistical Analysis

Radical Measures

A database or mainstream methodology to measure radicalization in order to compare states does not currently exist. Terror events are more easily measured and quantified. For example, the Global Terrorism Index provides a comparative measurement of states by considering terrorist attacks, number of deaths, and property damage.⁵⁰ This is then factored on a logarithmic scale in order to create an index from zero to ten. While this data should be included when analyzing radicalism, it does not account for other factors: foreign fighter flow, threat financing, and participation rates in terrorist groups. Unfortunately, data for threat financing is not generally made public; some data was available for Southeast Asia, but not enough to be included in this study. With regards to terrorist groups, the State Department publishes a list of fifty-eight terrorist organizations, but there is no reliable reporting mechanism on current membership strengths.⁵¹ Despite being problematic, a measure of radicalization is needed.

⁵⁰ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, 96.

⁵¹ *Country Report on Terrorism 2015* (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2016), accessed September 17, 2016, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258249.pdf>.

This study uses the Global Terrorism Index, number of terrorist events, and foreign fighter flow to measure radicalism.⁵² In order to convert this data into a useable Radical Index, these three factors were adjusted. The Global Terrorism Index must be adjusted from logarithmic to arithmetic numbers. This study takes the base of the Global Terrorism Index and converts it to the raw score the index originally derived.⁵³ Using the Global Terrorism Database, this study counted the number of terrorist events from 1970 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2015.⁵⁴ The Radical Index attempts to differentiate between terrorist events that occurred before 9/11, while placing more weight on recent events. This study did not put further emphasis on events that occurred in 2015 because these were proportionately accounted for in the Global Terrorism Index. Additionally, this study accounts for population size with the Pew Research Center's dataset.⁵⁵ Using the Radical Index equation, this study takes the raw Global Terrorism Index score, half of the terrorist events before 9/11, the number of contemporary terrorist events, the foreign fighter flow, and adjusts for total population size. This number is multiplied by a coefficient in order to create whole numbers; 170,000 was chosen to give Indonesia a Radical Index score of one. This study references Indonesia in this manner due to its large population size and relative few terrorist events and foreign fighters. It may appear that the Radical Index places undue emphasis on the number of foreign fighters, but it is a better measurement of radical individual involvement. Also, it is unlikely that the number terrorist events equal group membership. Again, threat financing and group membership would increase the Radical Index's accuracy.

⁵² *Foreign Fighters*, 7-10.

⁵³ *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, 10-11.

⁵⁴ *Global Terrorism Database* [database online].

⁵⁵ *Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050* [database online].

$$\text{Radical Index} = \frac{e^{\text{GTI} \cdot 1.535} + \frac{1}{2} \text{Events}_{(1970 \text{ to } 2000)} + \text{Events}_{(2001 \text{ to } 2015)} + \text{Foreign Fighters}}{\text{Population}} \cdot 170000$$

This study focuses on countries in Southeast Asia, South Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. These regions were selected due to membership in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and further refined by Muslim population size by both volume and percentage. The study removed states with ongoing armed conflicts in four of the past five years.⁵⁶ This removed India, Iraq, Libya, Pakistan, Palestinian territories, the Philippines, Sudan, Syria, Thailand, and Yemen. The inclusion of these states greatly skewed the dataset due to ongoing conflict and the preponderance of terrorist events. These findings are presented in Table 1 on the next page. Throughout this study's many tables most of the columns have been color coded to aid identification of trends. Some key data points have been highlighted by boxes for quick detection.

⁵⁶ UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 4-2016 [database online].

Table 1. Radical Index

	Radical Index	Total Population, (Thousands) 2010, <i>Pew</i>	Percent Muslims, 2010, <i>Pew</i>	Global Terrorism Index. 2015	Terrorism Events, 1970-2000, <i>START</i>	Terrorism Events, 2001-2015, <i>START</i>	Terrorism Events, 2015. <i>START</i>	Persons per 2015 Event (Thousands)	Foreign Fighters in Iraq and Syria, <i>Soufan</i>	Muslims per Foreign Fighter
	Oman	0.1	2780	86.0	0	0	0			
	Brunei	0.6	400	75.0		1	0	0		
	UAE	0.7	7510	77.0	1.0 5	17	6	0	15	38533 3
Least Radical	Indonesia	1.0	23987 0	87.2	4.7 6	315	399	28	8567	700 29874 3
	Iran	1.1	73980	99.4	4.2 2	548	119	9	8220	
	Malaysia	1.2	28400	63.7	3.5 8	40	36	5	5680	100 18100 0
	Qatar	1.5	1760	67.6	0.0 0	4	3	1	1760	10 11900 0
	Bangladesh	2.0	14869 0	90.4	5.9 2	591	922	465	320	
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	31950	99.9	1.4 5	24	13	1	3195 0	120 0 26608
	Kuwait	7.0	2740	74.1	0.0 2	64	10	1	2740	70 29000
	Egypt	8.1	81120	94.9	6.8 1	475	132 4	582	139	100 0 76990
	Turkey	11.3	72750	98.0	5.7 4	252 4	103 3	416	175	210 0 33967
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	27450	93.0	4.0 1	24	169	103	267	250 0 10208

Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	1260	70.6	4.8 7	39	143	18	70		
	Jordan	70.4	6190	97.1	1.7 5	71	21	4	1548	250 0	2404
	Tunisia	99.5	10480	99.5	3.7 0	13	79	17	616	600 0	1738
	Maldives	115. 8	320	96.9		0	17	2	160	200	1550
	Lebanon	128. 6	4230	61.2	6.3 8	188 1	532	44	96	900	2878

Sources: Data adapted from *Religious Composition by Country, 2010-2050*, Pew Research Center; *Global Terrorism Index, 2015*, Institute for Economics and Peace; *Global Terrorism Database*, START; *Foreign Fighters*, Soufan Group.

When analyzing this data, it is of note that neither the total population nor percentage of Muslims factor in the Global Terrorism Index ranking. It is evident when taking population into account, the Global Terrorism Index alone is not helpful; Indonesia is over an entire order of magnitude more dangerous than Tunisia. This is the equivalent of being ten times more affected by terrorism. Meanwhile, over one in every eighteen hundred Muslims in Tunisia has departed for Iraq or Syria to fight. Whereas only one in almost three hundred thousand Indonesians have traveled to fight. Also, Indonesia has almost fourteen times as many people per terrorist event than Tunisia. With six thousand foreign fighters recruited, Tunisia is the largest contributor to the conflict in Iraq and Syria. Therefore, Tunisia appropriately deserves a higher Radical Index score. Indonesia, with such a large population and low number of events and fighters, warrants a low score. While the Global Terrorism Index data is lacking for Oman, Brunei, Qatar, and the Maldives, their Radical Index score correlates with the number of terrorist events and foreign fighter

participation. The two largest advantages of this newly constructed Radical Index are accounting for population and foreign fighter flow.

With regards to population size, for every eight and a half million people in Indonesia, there was a terrorist attack in 2015. In Lebanon, an attack occurs per every ninety-six thousand. Indonesia has one of the lowest terrorist event rates. Morocco has the lowest total number of terrorist events, yet still readily contributes to the foreign fighter flow. Despite Indonesia having more terrorist events than the average and a considerable number of foreign fighters, it has little radicalization when based on population size. When examining the Maldives, it has little terrorist activity but has the highest foreign fighter participation rate and thus more radicalized overall. When attempting to compare radicalization between countries, population size matters.

While the Radical Index does not account for threat financing and terrorist group participation, it does provide a framework to assess these target countries against each other. Throughout the remainder of this study, this ranking will be used as a benchmark to determine the correlation between radicalism and secular factors. Jordan, Tunisia, the Maldives, and Lebanon have some of the highest participation in the foreign fighter flow, yet have a low occurrence record of terrorist events. This highlights the importance of the Radical Index and its account for population size and multiple radical indicators. The Radical Index provides a different lens of reviewing radical behavior within a country. This study will group these four countries and Bahrain in the highest radicalized category. Bangladesh, Egypt, and Turkey, while having higher Global Terrorism Index scores, when accounting for population size and foreign fighter flow, are of moderate concern. Indonesia, having the world's largest Muslim population (larger than North

Africa or the Levant and Arabian Peninsula), appears to be one of the lowest contributors to radicalization in the world. This study will focus on what secular factors contribute to this reality.

Population Demographics

This study began by looking at each country's population demographics, these are presented in Table 2 on the next page. Unfortunately, simply comparing a country's demographics based on its Radical Index score yielded few insights. For example, no apparent correlation is found when looking at the percentage of a country's population that is urban and its Radical Index score. Even taking the average of the least radical and the most radical bands presents similar results with the least radical band averaging 70.4% urban and the most radical band with 74.3% urban. This study then accounted for each country's population size. Taking population size into account highlights the difference between urbanization of the least and most radical band at 50.6% and 76.3% respectively. By accounting for population size a correlation emerged, countries with the most radicalized population are more urban and least radicalized populations are more rural. This weighted average process has been repeated for other indicators. The results of this process are produced at the bottom of each table. Many of this study's insights are derived from this aggregated data. Of note, the least radicalized band encompasses five hundred and three million people and the most radical band has twenty-two million people. The moderately radical band has a population of two hundred and sixteen million. The vast majority of Muslims live in countries less prone to radicalization.

Table 2. Population Demographics

	Radical Index	Population (millions)	Maternal Mortality Ratio (deaths per 100 000 live births)	Adolescent birth rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19)	Life Expectancy at Birth, years	Urban (%)	Female Adult Mortality Rate (per 1,000 people), 2013		Mean Years of Schooling (years)	Adult Literacy Rate	Population with some secondary education, (% 25 and older)
Least Radical	Oman	2.8	11	11	76.8	74.2	73	116	8.0	86.9	53.9
	Brunei	0.4	27	23	78.8	77.1	69	101	8.8	95.4	65.9
	UAE	7.5	8	28	77.0	85.2	59	84	9.5	90.0	64.3
	Indonesia	239.9	190	48	68.9	53.0	121	176	7.6	92.8	44.5
	Iran	74.0	23	32	75.4	69.5	83	153	8.2	84.3	65.1
	Malaysia	28.4	29	6	74.7	74.8	86	169	10.0	93.1	68.2
	Qatar	1.8	6	10	78.2	99.2	50	72	9.1	96.7	60.5
	Bangladesh	148.7	170	81	71.6	29.9	126	156	5.1	58.8	37.8
Moderately	Morocco	32.0	120	36	74.0	58.1	121	170	4.4	67.1	25.3
	Kuwait	2.7	14	14	74.4	98.3	42	59	7.2	95.5	56.0
	Egypt	81.1	45	43	71.1	44.0	117	193	6.6	73.9	52.1
	Turkey	72.8	20	31	75.3	74.3	73	147	7.6	94.9	49.4
	Saudi Arabia	27.5	16	10	74.3	82.9	67	89	8.7	94.4	66.5
Most Radical	Bahrain	1.3	22	14	76.6	88.9	54	70	9.4	94.6	54.9
	Jordan	6.2	50	26	74.0	83.4	96	131	9.9	97.9	74.1
	Tunisia	10.5	46	5	74.8	67.0	69	130	6.8	79.7	39.3
	Maldives	0.3	31	4	76.8	44.5	55	86	5.8	98.4	30.1
	Lebanon	4.2	16	12	79.3	87.6	46	70	7.9	89.6	54.2

Least Radical Band	503.4	146.0	52	71.2	50.6	113	164	7.1	81.5	47.3
Moderately Radical	216.0	43.6	33	73.4	61.9	95	159	6.8	82.8	49.1
Most Radical Band	22.5	39.9	13	75.6	76.3	71	115	8.0	87.7	52.4

Sources: Data adapted from *Human Development Index, 2015*, United Nations Development Programme.

This study first looked at a wide array of demographics to determine an initial causal relationship between radicalization and the population's inherent demographics. This study did not find a great correlation between: percentage of Muslims, population density, population distribution by age, gender equality ratio, gender development ratio, or dependency ratio. These factors were generally similar across the board for the observed countries.⁵⁷ Comparing these country's population distributions by age yielded divergent results. Both the most and least radical bands had countries with a population bubble that strayed from the normal distribution. Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, the Maldives, and Bahrain all have a burgeoning middle age population (twenty to forty-four) with a smaller than average youth population (younger than twenty).⁵⁸ Coincidentally, Tunisia and Indonesia have a similar population distribution.

When comparing the maternal mortality rate per one hundred thousand live births in Table 2, the most radical band is not terribly different from the least radical band, excluding Indonesia and Bangladesh. These two countries have an astounding 190 and 170 deaths per

⁵⁷ *Human Development Index, 2015* [database online] (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 2015), accessed September 10, 2016, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi>.

⁵⁸ *International Data Base* [database online] (Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, 2016), accessed September 30, 2016, <http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>.

hundred thousand respectively. These two countries inflate the maternal mortality rate for the least radicalized band to an average of 146 deaths per ten thousand live births. The most radical band averages around forty which would be worse than the least radical band if Indonesia and Bangladesh were excluded. For teenagers, the adolescent birth rate for the least radical band is over fifty per one thousand teenage girls and around thirteen for the most radicalized countries. Bangladesh tops the list at eighty births per one thousand teenage girls. Once born, the most radical band lives an average four years longer at seventy-five and a half years. Indonesia has the lowest life expectancy of any of these countries at just under sixty-nine years. From this data, it is apparent that the least radical countries have a higher mortality rate, have shorter lifespans, and have more children at a younger age. This is contrary to what could be assumed about radical group participants.

The data in Table 2 also demonstrates that in the most radicalized band, 76% of the population lives in urban areas. In the least radical band, just over half of the population lives in cities. Less than a third of Bangladeshis live in a city and almost half of Indonesians live in the countryside. Additionally, the least radical band has a much higher adult mortality rate; with an average of 113 female deaths and 164 male deaths per one thousand people. The most radical band averages 71 female and 115 male deaths per one thousand people. While it appears that many of these countries have high mortality rates, the most radical band is fairly close to the average of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) rates: 60 for female mortality and 113 for male mortality rates per one thousand people.⁵⁹ The least radical band falls somewhere between those countries experiencing high and medium human

⁵⁹ *Human Development Index, 2015* [database online].

development; 85 and 148 for females and 143 and 225 for males respectively.⁶⁰ This infers that radicalization happens more frequently in more highly developed nations. This could impact decisions on how a country decides to modernize its physical and social infrastructure if concerned about violent Muslim radicals.

In terms of education, the bands are similar; on average, the most radical band receives one more year of schooling with a total average of eight years. The typical Bangladeshi pupil only finishes five years of schooling. Unsurprisingly there is a strong correlation between mean years of schooling and the adult literacy rate. On average the most radical band has about 6% more literate adults. Most countries, regardless of radical tendencies, have above 90% adult literacy rates. Of note, about 93% of Indonesians are literate while less than 80% Tunisians are. This finding presents a similar correlation between the percentage of the population with some secondary education; the most radical band scores 5% more. Coinciding with literacy, the most radical band is marginally more educated; this segment of the population is more likely aware of a broader array of issues. This corresponds with Goli and Rezaei research on radicalism discussed in the literature review.

Demographically speaking, there is little variance between these analyzed countries. Though on average, people residing in more radical countries are more developed, live in cities, live longer, have greater education and are more literate. The least radical countries are more rural, have more teenage pregnancies, a higher adult mortality rate, and are more likely to die in childbirth. These factors alone probably do not infer radicalization, but are indicators of other

⁶⁰ Ibid.

factors that will be explored when analyzing employment and governance. Countries will have to manage and balance development and the increased risk of creating the conditions in which violent Muslim radicals thrive.

Employment

This study next looked at employment.⁶¹ An underlying assumption is that those with idle hands have more time to participate in radical groups. In Table 3 below, polarity exists between the least radical band and the most radical band with regards to employment. First off, the least radical countries on average have almost 20% higher participation rates in the work force at 65%. Iran across the board does poorly compared to its band while Bahrain does fairly well. As with the disparity in labor force participation, unemployment rates favor the least radical countries. While again Iran's statistics brings its group's weighted average down, the most radical countries have almost twice the rate of unemployment. Particularly concerning is the percentage of those who are unemployed with college education; almost a third of the most radical band's unemployed have a college degree. This is reminiscent of intelligentsia movements and revolution.⁶² Particularly, Indonesia's college graduates are under 8% unemployment while Tunisia's are over 30% unemployed. Having greater education and fewer job prospects may lend to greater opportunities for radicalization.

⁶¹ *World Development Indicators, 2015* [database online] (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2015) accessed September 20, 2016, <http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators>.

⁶² Jane Burbank, *Intelligentsia and Revolution: Russian Views of Bolshevism, 1917-1922* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 8-9.

Table 3. Employment Factors

		Radicalization Index	Labor force participation rate, total %	Labor force participation rate, female %	Labor force participation rate, male %	Ratio of female to male labor force participation	Unemployment, total	Unemployment, female	Unemployment, male	Unemployment with tertiary education %	Employment in agriculture (% of total employment)	Employment in industry (% of total employment)	Employment in services (% of total employment)
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	66.3	29.3	83.2			14.0	6.1				
	Brunei	0.6	63.7	52.2	75.0	80.4	1.7	4.0	3.6		0.6	18.7	80.8
	UAE	0.7	80.5	46.4	92.9			8.6	2.7				
	Indonesia	1.0	67.7	51.4	84.0	60.3	5.9	7.2	5.6	7.7	34.3	21.0	44.8
	Iran	1.1	45.4	16.7	74.0	19.2	10.6	19.6	11.3		17.9	33.8	48.3
	Malaysia	1.2	59.6	44.5	75.7	66.4	2.9	2.2	1.8	28.8	12.2	27.4	60.3
	Qatar	1.5	86.6	50.7	95.5	55.2	0.3	1.9	0.1	38.9	1.4	51.6	46.8
	Bangladesh	2.0	70.9	57.6	84.0			5.0	3.9				
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	50.7	26.7	75.9	34.8	9.9	10.9	9.9	18.5	39.2	21.4	39.4
	Kuwait	7.0	68.5	43.8	83.3	70.6	3.6	2.4	3.1		1.2	40.2	58.6
	Egypt	8.1	49.3	23.8	75.0	31.2	13.2	27.8	8.5	31.1	28.0	24.1	47.9
	Turkey	11.3	49.4	29.3	70.8	42.4	9.9	10.7	8.6	21.0	19.7	28.4	51.9
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	55.2	20.4	78.4	26.1	5.9	20.2	3.1	49.8	4.9	24.2	70.9
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	69.9	39.1	86.7	49.2	1.2	6.7	3.2	20.2			
	Jordan	70.4	41.8	15.8	66.9	21.9	12.6	19.5	9.2	37.0	1.8	18.5	79.6
	Tunisia	99.5	47.7	25.2	71.0	36.6	15.9	15.8	12.4	30.9	14.8	33.5	51.5
	Maldives	115.8	67.2	56.6	77.8			18.4	6.7				
	Lebanon	128.6	47.8	23.7	71.2			11.0	5.0				
Least Radical Band			65.2	47.5	82.2	52.0	6.6	8.1	5.7	10.1	28.7	24.4	46.9

Moderately Radical	50.5	25.9	74.3	35.4	10.6	18.3	8.0	28.2	23.6	25.4	51.0
Most Radical Band	47.6	23.6	70.9	32.4	13.7	15.4	9.5	32.3	10.0	27.9	61.9

Source: Data adapted from *World Development Indicators, 2015*, The World Bank.

Gender also plays a factor. Seen in Table 3, female labor participation rates for the least radical band are double of those most at risk for radicalism. Despite this disparity, female participation in the workforce for both bands are far from that of their male colleagues. While the ratio of females to males in the workforce does not indicate a high level of integration with regards to the least radical band, it is vastly different than the most radicalized band. Though this distillation is not fully reliable since integration data is lacking for almost half of the countries. Considering the role of women with regards to Sharia and the nature of fundamentalist or conservative movements discussed above by Goli and Rezaei, this probably reflects a relationship between a country's radical tendencies and the integration of females in a society. A more progressive society is less likely to be radical.

When examining the types of employment that these populations participate in, several factors stand out. The least radical band is almost three times likely to be employed in agriculture. Conversely, employees in the most radical band are more likely to work in the service industry. Participation rates in industry are similar. Of note, 20% more of Indonesia's population are working in the fields than Tunisia's. It is also important to point out that data for the type of employment is sparse and should not be used to derive too much insight until more data is acquired.

Data in Table 3 presents a correlation with less education and higher participation in agriculture. Likewise, those countries with a more educated population find work in industry and

the service sector. Countries whose populations have higher education, fewer job prospects in the service industry, and poor integration of women in the workforce indicate a higher propensity towards radical extremism.

Economy

After exploring employment, this study broadly examined these nations' economy as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Unless otherwise stated, US dollars are used. Earning data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) dataset is presented in local currencies.⁶³ It has been corrected to be represented in US dollars in Table 4.⁶⁴ Income data presented from Numbeo was obtained by crowdsourcing and is used in other scholarly works. The value differential between Numbeo's self-reported sources and ILO's is likely due to the variation between household income and individual income. According to Table 4 below, the average household size for the least radical band is 4.0 persons per home and the most radical band is 4.8 persons.⁶⁵ This can explain the differences between Numbeo and the ILO's data. Additionally, the OECD average household size is 2.6 persons.⁶⁶ This means that there are potentially more earners and dependents in a household, creating both opportunity for higher income and greater fiscal responsibilities.

⁶³ *ILOSTAT Database* [database online] (New York: United Nations International Labour Organization, 2015) accessed October 17, 2016, http://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/help_home/data_by_country?_adf.ctrl-state=v3we48a3a_280&_afLoop=251679659166924#!7

⁶⁴ Current exchange rates were used from www.xe.com/currencyconverter/ on October 17, 2016.

⁶⁵ *The World Economic Factbook, 2014*, 21st ed. (London: Euromonitor International, 2013), 30-31.

⁶⁶ *Doing Better for Families* (Paris: OECD, 2011), 19 accessed November 29, 2016, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932392457>.

Table 4. Economic Factors

		Radicalization Index	GDP (billions), 2016, WDI	GDP per capita growth (annual %), WDI	GDP per capita, PPP, 2011, WDI	GDP per person employed, PPP, 2011, WDI	Average disposable income after taxes, <i>Numbeo</i>	Mean Nominal Monthly Earnings in USD, <i>ILO</i>	Average Household Size, <i>Euromonitor</i>
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	\$70.3	-2.4	\$35,983	\$81,801	\$2,087	\$909	7.0
	Brunei	0.6	\$15.5	-1.9	\$66,647	\$158,975	\$2,228	\$827	5.7
	UAE	0.7	\$370.3	2.4	\$66,102	\$96,012	\$3,081	\$1,295	5.0
	Indonesia	1.0	\$861.9	3.5	\$10,385	\$21,958	\$304	\$145	3.9
	Iran	1.1	\$425.3	3.0	\$16,507	\$50,434	\$448		3.5
	Malaysia	1.2	\$296.2	3.5	\$25,308	\$55,732	\$980	\$668	4.3
	Qatar	1.5	\$166.9	0.7	\$135,322	\$181,163	\$4,038	\$2,591	5.3
	Bangladesh	2.0	\$195.1	5.3	\$3,137	\$5,661	\$340	\$95	4.3
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	\$100.4	3.0	\$7,361	\$22,732	\$416	\$13	4.8
	Kuwait	7.0	\$112.8	-4.0	\$67,113	\$155,780	\$2,237	\$2,062	6.8
	Egypt	8.1	\$330.8	2.0	\$10,250	\$37,045	\$264	\$193	3.9
	Turkey	11.3	\$718.2	2.5	\$18,959	\$57,476	\$756	\$53	3.8
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	\$646.0	1.3	\$50,284	\$145,822	\$1,786	\$617	5.6
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	\$32.2	1.8	\$44,182	\$84,656	\$1,227	\$854	5.9
	Jordan	70.4	\$37.5	0.0	\$10,240	\$41,412	\$637	\$617	5.2
	Tunisia	99.5	\$43.0	-0.2	\$10,726	\$34,920	\$393	\$117	4.1
	Maldives	115.8	\$3.1	-0.5	\$11,892	\$27,716	\$627	\$270	6.3
	Lebanon	128.6	\$47.1	-2.6	\$13,117	\$42,438	\$937	\$458	5.5

Least Radical Band	\$555.4	3.9	\$11,440	\$25,336	\$440	\$198	4.0
Moderately Radical	\$464.5	2.2	\$18,564	\$57,138	\$671	\$197	4.2
Most Radical Band	\$41.1	-0.5	\$12,934	\$40,807	\$613	\$362	4.8

Sources: Data adapted from *World Development Indicators (WDI)*, 2015, The World Bank; *Countries Compared by Cost of Living*, Numbeo; *ILOSTAT Database*, International Labour Organization (ILO); *The World Economic Factbook*, 2015, Euromonitor International.

Table 4 clearly presents a correlation between a country's overall GDP and its citizens' participation in radical groups. The least radical band's GDP is thirteen and a half times that of the most radical band; the more a country makes, the less radical it is. In the least radical band, Oman and Brunei's production is lowest. Oman's GDP is still higher than the largest, most radical band's GDP. Though Brunei makes less than some of the most radical countries, its population is small enough that its GDP per capita is still reasonably high. Additionally, the annual GDP percent growth is higher in the least radical band. The weighted averages for the least radical countries are positive while the most radical band has negative growth. This presents a strong inverse relationship between a country's economic health and its citizens' propensity towards becoming a violent Muslim radical.

This correlation dissipates when GDP is controlled per capita. Table 4 shows that GDP per capita for the least radical band is about \$1,500 less than the most radical countries. When GDP is controlled to those employed, the most radical band makes about 60% more than the least radical band. This is unsurprising because the least radical band is more agrarian while people in the most radical band are more likely to be employed in the service industry as observed in Table 3. A service based economy should be more productive than one based on farming. While less radical countries have a higher GDP, their people earn less.

Even though data in each column is intriguing, results emerge when taken collectively. Almost all of the most radical band's countries produce below \$14,000 GDP per capita. This alone is not relevant because Egypt, Morocco, Bangladesh, and Indonesia all produce just as little per person. Yet, these moderate and least radical band countries show positive GDP growth and between three to fifteen times the overall national GDP when compared to the most radical band. The most radical band is characterized by having a very low national GDP, negative growth, and produce around \$10,000 to \$13,000 per person. The countries that also have a low GDP per capita have strong national production. This may allow countries in the least radical band to pay more for institutions and other government services. Again, Indonesia and Tunisia reflect this paradox.

While exploring GDP is a great tool, these statistics do not thoroughly penetrate socio-economic strata. Numbeo collected crowdsourced data from participants who elected to disclose their after tax, disposable household income. There is a correlation between household's disposable income and radicalism. The most radical band has about 50% more cash on hand than the least radical band. This same trend is repeated in the ILO's findings about nominal monthly earnings. Table 4 shows the same relationship as the self-reported disposable income, between individual earnings and radicalism. The most radical band again earns more, \$362 per month compared to \$198 per month for the least radical countries. This means that at the end of the month, one does not have enough money to participate in radical groups. This observation could mean that the least radical countries may have potential more radicals in their midst, but they are too poor to join a group and support their family.

Poverty, Social Assistance, and Quality of Life

When reviewing the poverty level data provided by the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) *World Factbook*, there was little correlation between a country's population living under \$1.25 a day and radicalism.⁶⁷ However, there is a correlation with those living under the working poverty rates of \$2 a day, see Table 5. Using the weighted average, the least radical band has over 40% of its citizens living below the working poverty rate, while the most radical band has under 3% of its population living on less than \$2 per day. This study also wanted to see the impact of how those earnings are spent by reviewing the Consumer Price Index.⁶⁸ Table 5 shows that the least radical band spends more on goods and services than the most radical band. Overall, lower participation rates in violent Muslim radical groups for the least radical band is probably due to most citizen being employed, yet barely putting enough food on the table, and paying more for what they consume. They do not have the time or means to participate in violent Muslim radical groups.

⁶⁷ *The World Factbook, 2013-14* (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013) accessed October 10, 2016, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2046.html>.

⁶⁸ *Human Development Index, 2015* [database online].

Table 5. Poverty, Social Assistance, and Quality of Life

		Radicalization Index	Working Poverty Rates (% < \$2 per day), CIA	Consumer Price Index (2000 = 100), 2013, HDI	All Social Assistance	All Social Assistance (Billions)	All Social Assistance (\$ per person)	All Social Assistance (\$ per person living on < \$2 per day)	Social Progress Index	Human Development Index, HDI
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	1.4	108.4						0.793
	Brunei	0.6		102.9						0.856
	UAE	0.7	0.7	102.7					73.69	0.835
	Indonesia	1.0	38.5	116.9	0.65	\$5.61	\$23.40	\$60.79	62.27	0.684
	Iran	1.1	5.7	214.0					59.45	0.766
	Malaysia	1.2	1.1	107.1	0.74	\$2.19	\$77.15	\$7,013.64	70.08	0.779
	Qatar	1.5	0.2	107.1						0.850
	Bangladesh	2.0	71.1	126.4	1.09	\$2.12	\$14.25	\$20.04	52.73	0.570
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	8.7	104.1	2.35	\$2.36	\$73.73	\$847.50	61.92	0.628
	Kuwait	7.0	0.6	111.2	0.77	\$0.86	\$315.65	\$52,609.03	71.84	0.816
	Egypt	8.1	10.8	129.1	0.17	\$0.56	\$6.93	\$64.19	60.74	0.690
	Turkey	11.3	2.6	124.6	1.32	\$9.49	\$130.49	\$5,018.81	67.82	0.761
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	1.1	112.7					66.30	0.837
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8		105.6	1.14	\$0.37	\$292.54			0.824
	Jordan	70.4	1.3	115.4	0.68	\$0.26	\$41.43	\$3,187.05	65.43	0.748
	Tunisia	99.5	3.3	116.0	0.55	\$0.24	\$22.62	\$685.49	68.00	0.721
	Maldives	115.8		129.4	1.25	\$0.04	\$122.37			0.706

Lebanon	128.6	4.2	111.9	1.04	\$0.49	\$115.86	\$2,758.67	64.42	0.769
Least Radical Band	40.3	133.1	0.81	\$4.13	\$23.80	\$519.83	59.62	0.671	
Moderately Radical	6.4	121.6	0.99	\$4.32	\$70.41	\$2,872.04	64.15	0.725	
Most Radical Band	2.9	114.7	0.72	\$0.29	\$61.89	\$1,845.98	66.51	0.743	

Source: Data adapted from *The World Factbook, 2013-14*, CIA; *Human Development Index, 2015*, United Nations Development Programme; *The Atlas of Social Protection Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE)*, The World Bank; *Social Progress Index, 2016*, Social Progress Imperative.

Next this study looked at The World Bank's data on government spending on social assistance.⁶⁹ There is not a large variance on the percent of GDP that countries spend on social programs. The total amount of spending on programs correlates to the size of the economy; the richer, less radical countries spend more overall on social assistance. Upon closer inspection, countries in the most radical band spend almost three times more on social welfare per person than the least radical band. This is about \$62 per person in the most radical band compared to under \$24 per person in the least radical band. If social warfare is only expended on those living on less than two dollars per day, the gap widens from about \$1,846 for the most radical band to about \$520 for the least radical band. While data is not comprehensive for the entire group, a trend appears; the most radical band spends more on social assistance. It is possible this enables the educated and unemployed members of their societies to participate in radical groups without needing to find employment.

⁶⁹ *The Atlas of Social Protection: Indicators of Resilience and Equity (ASPIRE)* [database online] (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2016) accessed November 29, 2016, <http://datatopics.worldbank.org/aspire/home>.

In order to evaluate the quality of life for each country and band's citizens, this study turned to the Social Progress Index and the Human Development Index (HDI). Data is presented in Table 5 demonstrates the capacity of a society to meet its population's basic human needs.⁷⁰ This index analyzed fifty-three indicators grouped by: Basic Human Needs, Foundations of Well-being, and Opportunity. As an aggregate, both the least and most radical bands are considered to have lower-middle social progress. Malaysia, the UAE, and Tunisia are considered upper-middle, while Bangladesh has low social progress. Comparatively, the Human Development Index measures the quality of life and standard of living.⁷¹ While this index produces a similar distribution, more countries are considered to have very high quality of life: Brunei, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Only Indonesia and Bangladesh have a medium quality of life. All in all, the most radical band has a greater capacity to meet its citizens needs and provides a higher quality of life. This is very interesting despite the lower employment levels.

Indonesia and Tunisia are very similar in every category in Table 4 and Table 5 except for total GDP, GDP growth, percentage of population living on less than \$2 a day, and social assistance per those in working poverty. Per capita, the populations of these two countries are very similar. Their GDP is around ten thousand dollars per person. Each country's citizens earn about \$125 monthly as an individual and have about \$350 to spend at the end of the month as a household. Even the cost of goods and services are similar. As this study examines each of the demographics a

⁷⁰ Michael E. Porter and Scott Stern, *Social Progress Index, 2016* (Washington, DC: Social Progress Imperative, 2016), 12, accessed November 29, 2016, <http://www.socialprogressimperative.org/global-index/>.

⁷¹ *Human Development Report, 2015* (Washington, DC: United Nations Development Programme, 2015), 29.

trend keeps reemerging between these two nations. While Indonesia has the largest population, Tunisia has one of the most radical populations yet many demographics are similar. This study will continue to highlight the similarities and differences between the two.

Something is happening in the most radical countries where the population can have higher unemployment yet still have significantly less people living in working poverty. These countries' productivity, as measured by GDP, is significantly lower than the least radical band. In fact, the most radical band possesses a negative growth rate. Yet per capita, the most radical countries earn slightly more and have more disposable income at the end of the month. This section observes a trend that the least radical countries are more productive and consequently have more money to provide services while their citizens are more likely to be impoverished and earn less. A more radical country as a whole produces less while the fewer employed persons earn more in a serviced based economy. Coupled with greater government spending on social programs, potentially frees up other members of a household to participate in violent Muslim radical groups.

Governance

In order to analyze government types this study used the Polity IV dataset.⁷² This dataset assessed each country for democratic and autocratic tendencies on a scale of one to ten, then combined the score to determine a Polity 2 score. Previously the Polity IV project used a Polity score to determine a country's overall democratic or autocratic tendencies. After 2002, the project adjusted the scores to a Polity 2 score in order to standardize the results and compare

⁷² *Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2015* [database online] (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2015), accessed October 23, 2016, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>.

countries across a time series.⁷³ A positive Polity 2 score is more democratic while a negative score is autocratic. Table 6 summarizes the Polity IV data for 2015 and 2006 and uses vertical lines to delineate the different time periods. This study calculated the change in government type over the last decade. Also included is the duration that the government has been in power. Not included in the Polity IV database were Brunei and the Maldives; the weighted averages take their absence into account.

⁷³ Monty G. Marshall, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2015, Dataset Users' Manual* (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, 2015), 8.

Table 6. Type of State

		Radical Index	Democratic, 2015,	Autocratic, 2015,	Polity 2, 2015,	Durable, 2015, (years)	Democratic, 2006,	Autocratic, 2006,	Polity 2, 2006,	Durable, 2006, (years)	Democratic, 10-year change, (+ is most democratic)	Autocratic, 10-year change, (+ is most autocratic)	Polity 2, 10-year change,
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	0	8	-8	58	0	8	-8	49	0	0	0
	Brunei	0.6											
	UAE	0.7	0	8	-8	44	0	8	-8	35	0	0	0
	Indonesia	1.0	9	0	9	16	8	0	8	7	1	0	1
	Iran	1.1	0	7	-7	11	0	6	-6	2	0	1	-1
	Malaysia	1.2	6	1	5	7	4	1	3	35	2	0	2
	Qatar	1.5	0	10	-10	44	0	10	-10	35	0	0	0
	Bangladesh	2.0	3	2	1	1	6	0	6	15	-3	2	-5
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	1	5	-4	50	0	6	-6	41	1	-1	2
	Kuwait	7.0	0	7	-7	51	0	7	-7	42	0	0	0
	Egypt	8.1	0	4	-4	2	1	4	-3	1	-1	0	-1
	Turkey	11.3	4	1	3	1	8	1	7	23	-4	0	-4
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	0	10	-10	89	0	10	-10	80	0	0	0
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	0	10	-10	3	0	7	-7	31	0	3	-3
	Jordan	70.4	2	5	-3	26	2	4	-2	17	0	1	-1
	Tunisia	99.5	7	0	7	1	1	5	-4	19	6	-5	11
	Maldives	115.8											
	Lebanon	128.6	6	0	6	10	6	0	6	1	0	0	0

Least Radical Band	5.5	1.9	3.6	11.1	5.8	1.1	4.7	11.0	-0.3	0.7	-1.0
Moderately Radical	1.5	3.9	-2.4	20.4	3.1	4.1	-1.0	24.9	-1.6	-0.1	-1.4
Most Radical Band	5.0	2.0	3.0	9.8	2.7	4.8	-2.1	19.4	2.8	-1.9	4.8

Source: Data adapted from *Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800-2015*, Center for Systemic Peace.

When observing data from 2015, it is amazing that the least radical band and the most radical band are similar in the type of government. Both bands are fairly democratic with some autocratic tendencies and their governments average about ten years in power. The ten-year change from 2006 does not initially seem considerable; Bangladesh has become less democratic while Tunisia has become much more so. In fact, the most radical countries are becoming more democratic (4.8) while the less radical countries are slightly more autocratic (-1.0). This could give considerable pause to governments as they liberalize. This point is well argued by Ian Bremmer in *The J Curve*.⁷⁴ While the democratic rise of Tunisia does skew the ten-year change, it also produces the most radicals per capita. Simply being an autocracy or democracy does not drive a population to radical groups. Yet it appears as a country democratizes, it will face considerable challenges with radicalization.

Next the study reviewed how these moderately democratic states fared in ability to govern. Using The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators on a -2.5 to 2.5 scale, this study compared the most radical and least radical bands.⁷⁵ These indicators, compiled in Table 7 below,

⁷⁴ Ian Bremmer, *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).

⁷⁵ *Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2015* [database online] (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2015) accessed October 11, 2016, <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home>.

omits both Iran and Bangladesh. While these are both important countries to this study, their scores are at the opposite end of the spectrum from the others in their band. While Indonesia also has negative scores, they are not as disparate as Iran and Bangladesh.

Table 7. Governance Indicators

		Radical Index	Voice and Accountability	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/ Terrorism	Government Effectiveness	Regulatory Quality	Rule of Law	Control of Corruption	Sum (-15 to 15)
		(-2.5 to 2.5) Positive is Better							
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	-1.05	0.66	0.29	0.69	0.58	0.25	1.41
	Brunei	0.6	-0.66	1.27	1.08	0.97	0.50	0.63	3.79
	UAE	0.7	-1.06	0.81	1.48	0.98	0.71	1.23	4.15
	Indonesia	1.0	0.13	-0.37	-0.01	-0.10	-0.35	-0.58	-1.27
	Iran	1.1	-1.57	-0.91	-0.41	-1.46	-1.03	-0.57	-5.96
	Malaysia	1.2	-0.33	0.34	1.14	0.84	0.64	0.48	3.10
	Qatar	1.5	-0.98	1.00	0.99	0.57	0.99	1.09	3.66
	Bangladesh	2.0	-0.47	-0.88	-0.77	-0.94	-0.72	-0.91	-4.69
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	-0.70	-0.39	-0.14	-0.01	-0.06	-0.26	-1.56
	Kuwait	7.0	-0.65	0.14	-0.15	-0.13	0.05	-0.26	-1.01
	Egypt	8.1	-1.19	-1.58	-0.82	-0.75	-0.60	-0.59	-5.54
	Turkey	11.3	-0.32	-1.06	0.38	0.41	0.04	-0.12	-0.68
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	-1.78	-0.24	0.23	-0.01	0.27	0.10	-1.44
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	-1.32	-0.94	0.59	0.70	0.45	0.30	-0.23
	Jordan	70.4	-0.77	-0.56	0.13	0.08	0.48	0.15	-0.48
	Tunisia	99.5	0.03	-0.93	-0.13	-0.35	-0.12	-0.09	-1.59
	Maldives	115.8	-0.33	0.88	-0.37	-0.36	-0.49	-0.11	-0.78
	Lebanon	128.6	-0.42	-1.72	-0.38	-0.22	-0.76	-1.06	-4.56

Least Radical Band*	0.03	-0.24	0.16	0.04	-0.20	-0.40	-0.62
Moderately Radical	-0.89	-1.04	-0.17	-0.15	-0.19	-0.29	-2.74
Most Radical Band	-0.36	-0.95	-0.07	-0.15	-0.05	-0.19	-1.76

* Excludes Iran and Bangladesh

Source: Data adapted from *The Worldwide Governance Indicators*, The World Bank.

Because Table 7 is color coded, it is easy to see the least radical band is more effective at governing. Despite this observation, both the least and most radical bands are fairly similar. There is not a wide variance to the propensity of a citizen to become a violent Muslim radical and how effective the government is. After summation, there appears to be a correlation between radicalization and governance. While the least radical band has a negative score of -0.62, the most radical band is even worse off at -1.76 for governance. In order to show greater disparity, the least radical band would also have to exclude Indonesia to get a positive aggregate score of 3.22. This omission would greatly dilute the results. Additionally, a positive score of 3.22 does not indicate high levels of effectiveness summed on at -15 to 15 scale. Thus, even if one were to manipulate the data, the level of effective governance provides no indication for participation in violent Muslim radical groups.

All of the countries in this study rate poorly for “voice and accountability” except Indonesia and Tunisia. Again, their scores are not great but are the only two in the positive realm. Generally, the least radical countries rate better than the most radical countries in terms of effectiveness, but this disparity is minor. This study does not find a large correlation between the effectiveness of a government and its citizens radical tendencies.

After observing that the type and effectiveness of a government have little relation to radicalism, this study looked at the government's stability. Table 8 summarizes The Fund for Peace's Fragile States Index.⁷⁶ The Fragile States Index is on a 1 to 10 scale with numerous indicators. On the scale: 1 to 2 is excellent, 2 to 4 is good, 4 to 6 is moderate, 6 to 8 is weak, while 8 to 10 is poor. The overall state ranking is on a scale to 114; a score between 50 and 60 is "stable" while a score between 70 and 80 is "elevated warning."⁷⁷ A lower value in this dataset is better.

⁷⁶ *The Fragile States Index, 2015* [database online] (Washington, DC: The Fund for Peace, 2016) accessed September 23, 2016, <http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings-2016>.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

Source: Data adapted from *Fragile States Index, 2015*, The Fund for Peace.

While the overall weighted average ranking is similar between the least radical band and the most radical band, some nuances can be derived from this data. The least radical band suffers more from demographic pressures, human flight, and uneven development. While the most radical band is more prone to dealing with internally displaced persons and refugees, poverty and economic decline, and external intervention. Positively, the most radical band provides better public services. Meanwhile, both the least radical and most radical countries are weak on: group grievances, legitimacy of state, human rights, and fractionalized elites. Overall this tends to classify these aggregated bands as elevated-warning to high-warning states.⁷⁸

The most positive correlation is the ten-year change. The least radical states are improving at an average -5.6 on a -10 to 14 scale, negative values being an improvement. The most radical countries are worsening with a score of 4.3. In the least radical band, Brunei, the UAE, Indonesia, and Qatar are all showing “strong improvement,” while Oman is “worsening.”⁷⁹ Even economically poor Bangladesh is showing “some improvement.” In the most radical band, Tunisia and Bahrain are “worsening” while the Maldives is showing “strong improvement.” Countries that are not showing improvement appear to be most affected by violent Muslim radicals. This revelation, coupled with the difficulties the most radical band’s countries have with democratizing, could provide the fertile ground that violent Muslim radical groups need to thrive.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Ibid.

Voice and Rights

This study looked not only at government effectiveness, but at the civil liberties and political rights their citizens enjoy. Data in Table 9 is provided by Freedom House.⁸⁰ The Political Rights Aggregate is a summation of the Electoral Process, Political Pluralism, and Functioning of Government scores. The Civil Liberties Aggregate is comprised of the Freedom of Expression, Organizational Rights, Rule of Law, and Personal Autonomy scores. The Political Rights Aggregate is on a scale of 0 to 40, while the Civil Liberties Aggregate is on a scale of 0 to 60. A vertical line has been added to the chart to distinguish between the two sections.

Table 9. Political Rights and Civil Liberties

		Radical Index	Political Rights Aggregate, (0-40, 40 is Best)	Electoral Process, (12 is Best)	Political Pluralism and Participation. (16 is Best)	Functioning of Government, (12 is Best)	Civil Liberties Aggregate, (0-60, 60 is Best)	Freedom of Expression and Belief. (16 is Best)	Association and Organizational Rights. (12 is Best)	Rule of Law, (16 is Best)	Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights. (16 is Best)
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	6	2	2	2	17	5	3	4	5
	Brunei	0.6	6	0	3	3	22	6	3	6	7
	UAE	0.7	5	1	2	2	13	4	2	3	4
	Indonesia	1.0	31	11	14	6	34	12	8	5	9
	Iran	1.1	7	3	2	2	10	2	1	3	4
	Malaysia	1.2	18	6	7	5	27	7	6	5	9
	Qatar	1.5	7	2	2	3	18	8	2	4	4

⁸⁰ *Freedom in the World, 2016* [database online] (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2016), accessed October 18, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016>.

Moderately	Bangladesh	2.0	21	7	9	5	28	7	6	6	9
	Morocco	6.5	15	5	7	3	26	8	5	6	7
	Kuwait	7.0	13	2	7	4	23	6	4	7	6
	Egypt	8.1	9	3	4	2	18	5	4	2	7
	Turkey	11.3	24	9	9	6	29	8	6	6	9
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	1	0	0	1	7	3	0	2	2
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	7	2	2	3	10	2	1	1	6
	Jordan	70.4	11	2	6	3	25	7	4	6	8
	Tunisia	99.5	37	12	16	9	42	13	9	9	11
	Maldives	115.8	19	7	6	6	24	6	5	6	7
	Lebanon	128.6	13	2	9	2	30	11	7	5	7
Least Radical Band		23.2	8.1	10.1	5.0	27.8	8.6	6.1	5.0	8.1	
Moderately Radical		14.0	4.9	5.7	3.4	21.6	6.2	4.3	4.0	7.0	
Most Radical Band		23.4	6.7	11.0	5.7	33.0	10.3	6.7	6.9	9.1	

Source: Data adapted from *Freedom in the World, 2016*, Freedom House.

In Table 9, the countries in the least radical band predominately score low on political rights, but the weighted average is buoyed by Indonesia and Bangladesh. The most radical band generally has higher scores with Tunisia almost maxing out the scale as having the most political rights. From this dataset, both the least and most radical counties score similarly around 23 on Political Rights. Both bands also score similarly on Political Pluralism and Functioning Government. This finding is not dissimilar from the indices already discussed. Conversely, the least radical band does slightly better with the Electoral Process than the most radical band with scores of 8.1 and 6.7 respectively. Both the most and least radical bands are squarely in the middle of the Political Rights Aggregate scale. All in all, Political Rights do not seem to play in radicalization save how fair an election seems to be.

Surprisingly, the most radical band scores higher across the board on the Civil Rights indices. While it is not a great difference, these more radical countries have higher Freedom of Expression, Organizational Rights, and Personal Autonomy. The most radical band definitely outscores the least radical band in the Rule of Law. This could be the function of more radical states becoming more democratic and the least radical states becoming more autocratic as seen with the Polity IV data.

When reviewing this data, the most radical countries appear to score slightly better on political rights and civil liberties. In a reoccurring theme, Tunisia and Indonesia score similarly. Both are outliers and tend to skew the weighted average of their bands to their favor. Both score fairly high on all indices. Unfortunately, a definitive trend does not appear when reviewing political rights and civil liberties.

Next this study used Freedom House's Freedom of the Press dataset to distill any discernible differences between freedom of speech and radicalism.⁸¹ These scores are presented in Table 10. The Press Freedom Score is the summation of the other indicators on a scale of 0 to 100, lower scores are better. Freedom House additionally determines on the Freedom of the Press Status; most countries in this study are considered "Not Free" (NF).

⁸¹ *Freedom of the Press 2016 Table of Scores* [database online] (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2016), accessed October 18, 2016, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2016/table-country-scores-fotp-2016>.

Table 10. Freedom of the Press

		Radical Index	Press Freedom Score, (0-100, 0 is Best)	Legal Environment, (0-30, 0 is Best)	Political Environment, (0-40, 0 is Best)	Economic Environment, (0-30, 0 is Best)	Freedom of the Press Status, F=Free, NF=Not Free, PF=Partially Free
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	71	25	27	19	NF
	Brunei	0.6	76	28	25	23	NF
	UAE	0.7	78	25	30	23	NF
	Indonesia	1.0	49	16	18	15	PF
	Iran	1.1	90	30	36	24	NF
	Malaysia	1.2	67	26	24	17	NF
	Qatar	1.5	69	21	26	22	NF
	Bangladesh	2.0	61	18	27	16	NF
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	66	23	25	18	NF
	Kuwait	7.0	59	20	23	16	PF
	Egypt	8.1	77	25	35	17	NF
	Turkey	11.3	71	26	30	15	NF
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	86	29	32	25	NF
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	87	28	37	22	NF
	Jordan	70.4	66	22	24	20	NF
	Tunisia	99.5	52	17	18	17	PF
	Maldives	115.8	58	18	24	16	PF
	Lebanon	128.6	56	20	22	14	PF
Least Radical Band			60.2	19.4	23.9	16.9	

Moderately Radical	74.3	25.5	31.3	17.5
Most Radical Band	58.7	19.6	21.6	17.5

Source: Data adapted from *Freedom of the Press 2016 Table of Scores*, Freedom House.

Data presented in Table 10 does not provide a large correlation between freedom of the press and radicalism. Press in the most radical band enjoys slightly more freedom, but none of the countries are considered “Free” (F). All countries in this study fare worse than the 48.9 global average.⁸² The indicators in this dataset appear to correspond to the data reviewed previously in this study. Freedom House indicates that the economic environment is slightly better in the most radical countries. This parallels the previous finding that more people in the least radical countries live under the working poverty line. The Political and Legal Environment correspond to the Freedom House findings.

Again, there appears little correlation between freedom of the press and a countries radical tendencies. Indonesia is the only country in the least radical band that is considered “Partially Free.” The rest are “Not Free.” Over half of the countries in the most radical band are considered “Partially Free.” Once again, both Indonesia and Tunisia are score very similar on this index. Furthermore, it is unclear how much the press and governance contribute to the environment of radicalization.

Corruption

After analyzing governance, this study explores the population’s perceptions of their governments. It is one thing for a government to have stable institutions, it is another for citizens

⁸² *Freedom of the Press, 2016*, 5.

to recognize the legitimacy of their government's sovereignty. The data in Table 11 is compiled from a global questionnaire conducted by Transparency International.⁸³ This survey assembles people's perceptions of corruption in the different government institutions. Excluded from Table 11 are the military, NGOs, education, and medical services. All of these institutions provided no correlation to radicalism and were not considered corrupt by both the most and least radical bands. The private sector and business also showed little correlation but were viewed as slightly more corrupt than the above establishments. This study did not use all of the data from the questionnaire as some of the questions did not reveal a connection to radicalism. Unfortunately, beyond the Corruption Perception Index itself, data is sparse and revelations should be viewed cautiously.

⁸³ *Corruption Perception Index, 2015* [database online] (Berlin: Transparency International, 2015), accessed September 9, 2016, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/>.

Source: Data adapted from *Corruption Perceptions Index, 2015*, Transparency International.

55

Table 11 displays a large variance on how corrupt people view their country's institutions. As a whole, populations in the least radical band view the public sector as largely corrupt; slightly less so for the most radical band. Citizens in both the least radical and most radical bands believe that personal contacts are important to navigate the public sector. Of the institutions covered, the most radical band felt that the government was dominated by self-interested entities. Meanwhile the least radical band was plagued by perceptions that political parties, the legislature, judiciary, police, and public officials were all highly corrupt.

Disparate to these negative views were religious bodies. Both the most radical and least radical countries have a positive view of faith organizations. In Indonesia, this parallels the influence Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) exerts over the masses.⁸⁴ NU is a large, modernist Islamic movement in Indonesia. While not directly supporting the state, they are a moderating entity. The NU has made considerable efforts to delegitimize radical ideology and quash violence.⁸⁵

Additionally, the media is viewed as the least corrupt establishment by the least radical band. The most radical band views the media as suspect. The positive view of the media and the narrative provided by both the government and broadcasters may provide a great counter to jihadi propaganda. Further study should be devoted to this specific matter and is a research priority for institutions like the Joint Special Operations University.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Adhi Priamarizki, "Counter-Radicalisation in Indonesia: Fighting a Mutating Organism," *S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Commentaries*, no. 223 (December 11, 2012), 2.

⁸⁵ Greg Fealy, *Indonesian and Malaysian Support for the Islamic State (Final Report)* (Arlington, VA: Management Systems International, 2016), 22-23.

⁸⁶ *Special Operations Research Topics, 2017* (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Joint Special Operations University, 2016), 21.

Despite the perceptions of corruption in these countries, only 20% of those polled in the least radical countries were asked to pay a bribe. In the most radical band, 33% were asked to pay a bribe. Of those asked, 37% in the least radical band paid and 53% of the most radical band paid. This equates bribe compliance to 7.4% of the least radical band and 18.8% of the most radical band. There an inconsistency between the least radical band's perceptions of public corruption and the reality of bribes paid. Populations in the least radical band think their governments are corrupt, but in fact are less so.

As seen in earlier sections, the most radical band's government is becoming less stable, more democratic, and provides better public services. Yet there is greater corruption. The least radical band is viewed as becoming more stable and more autocratic, while scoring better on the Corruption Perception Index. While the least radical band's populations are unsure of their institutions, they are in fact less corrupt; this is interesting with regards to perceived legitimacy versus government implementation.⁸⁷ Data in this table presents a positive correlation with the lack of corruption and absence of radicalism in a society.

Compliance

In addition to the populations' perception of the government, this study examines their compliance or conforming to governmental regulation. Two possible approaches of measuring state control are the size of the shadow economy and tax compliance. Table 12 shows data

⁸⁷ Ian Hurd, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics," *International Organization* 53, no 2 (Spring 1999): 381.

compiled by Mattias Ottervik in his study on measuring state capacity.⁸⁸ The size of both the shadow economy and tax compliance indicates how legitimate the population views their government or how much the state can exert control.

⁸⁸ Mattias Ottervik, *Conceptualizing and Measuring State Capacity: Testing the Validity of Tax Compliance as a Measure of State Capacity* (Gothenburg, Sweden: University of Gothenburg, The Quality of Government Institute, 2013), 12, 34-37.

Table 12. Tax Compliance and Travel Distances

		Radicalization Index	Shadow Economy (% of official economy)	Tax Compliance (%)	Flight Miles to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia	Flight Miles to Istanbul, Turkey
Least Radical	Oman	0.1	18.1	84.7	1228	2083
	Brunei	0.6	31.0	76.3	5185	5802
	UAE	0.7	25.0	80.0	1057	1861
	Indonesia	1.0	18.5	84.4	4955	5879
	Iran	1.1	17.8	84.9	1192	1277
	Malaysia	1.2	30.4	76.7	4393	5186
	Qatar	1.5	18.5	84.4	825	1695
	Bangladesh	2.0	35.0	74.1	3256	3713
Moderately	Morocco	6.5	34.1	74.6	3167	2409
	Kuwait	7.0	18.5	84.4	757	1330
	Egypt	8.1	34.5	74.4	755	766
	Turkey	11.3	30.3	76.8	1461	0
	Saudi Arabia	17.0	17.5	85.1	0	1461
Most Radical	Bahrain	44.8	17.4	85.2	791	1607
	Jordan	70.4	17.9	84.8	604	858
	Tunisia	99.5	36.5	73.3	2023	1039
	Maldives	115.8	29.1	77.4	2600	3751
	Lebanon	128.6	32.6	75.4	865	615
Least Radical Band		24.1	80.9	3775	4428	

Moderately Radical	30.6	76.7	1254	847
Most Radical Band	29.5	77.6	1354	980

Source: Data adapted from *Conceptualizing and Measuring State Capacity*, University of Gothenburg; Travelmath.

The data in Table 12 shows the shadow economy as a percent of a country's legal economy. In the least radical band, the shadow economy is 24.1% of the legitimate economy while the most radical band is 5.4% higher. This shows less compliance to government institutions in the most radical band. In Indonesia, the shadow economy only accounts for 18.5% of the economy while it consists of 36.5% of the economy in Tunisia. This shows the lack of citizen compliance and government control in states with radicalization.

This phenomenon is again seen with tax compliance. Citizens in the least radical band are more likely to pay their taxes than the most radical band. As an aggregate, 80.9% of the least radical band pays taxes compared to 77.6% of the most radical band. This 3.3% difference is not great. Yet when reviewing the Radical Index, generally as a country's score increases, tax participation decreases. Of note, 84.4% of Indonesians pay their taxes while only 73.3% of Tunisians fulfill their obligation to the state. This presents a correlation between tax compliance and level of radicalization. Better yet, this shows a correlation between weaker state control and radicalization.

Travel to Jihad

This study also compiled potential travel miles to participate in jihad. This data is presented in Table 12. Potential miles traveled is presented in flight miles and derived from the

Travelmath website.⁸⁹ This data presents the most direct route and does not take into account circuitous travel in order to avoid the authorities to get to Iraq or Syria. The most common route jihadis take to fight with ISIS is through Turkey.⁹⁰ This is also true for Indonesians.⁹¹ Flight miles to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia are also presented; this is the common destination for pilgrims conducting the hajj. This is a secondary route to jihad. Most countries with a significant Muslim population have direct flights to Jeddah. Many Indonesians travel to Saudi Arabia for hajj and to study. Once there, they have been targeted by extremist recruiters and sent further abroad to fight.

The flight mile data present one of the starkest comparisons with radicalization. A would-be jihadist in the least radical band would have to travel an average of over 3,700 miles to Jeddah or almost 4,500 miles to Istanbul. The least radical band has to travel 2.7 times and 4.5 times as many miles as the most radical band to get to Jeddah and Istanbul respectively. It is much easier, and cheaper, for a Tunisian to travel just over 1,000 miles by plane to Turkey than for a radicalized Indonesian to travel near 6,000 miles to arrive at the same port of entry. While this only looks at air travel miles, many foreign fighters from the region travel overland or by sea to fulfill their perceived Islamic duty. Indonesians face greater difficulty and must possess more substantive means to join the fight. Due to this barrier, Indonesia could in fact harbor a larger violent Muslim radical population despite low participation rates.

⁸⁹ *Travelmath*, accessed October 31, 2016 from <http://www.travelmath.com/>.

⁹⁰ Alessandra Masi and Hanna Sender, "How Foreign Fighters Joining ISIS Travel To The Islamic State Group's 'Caliphate,'" *International Business Times* (February 3, 2015), accessed October 31, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.com/how-foreign-fighters-joining-isis-travel-islamic-state-groups-caliphate-1833812>.

⁹¹ Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, "Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict," *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report No 6*, January 30, 2014.

Summary

Overall, in the most radicalized band, the population lives longer, is more urbanized, spends more time in school, and has greater literacy. Less than half of the most radical band's population participate in the labor pool, have greater unemployment, most likely work in the service industry, poorly integrates women into the workforce, and approximately one third of those unemployed have a college degree. These countries have relatively low total GDP, yet make more per person employed while maintaining larger households. Not only does the most radical band have higher disposable income at the end of the month, they pay less for consumer goods. While less than three percent live under the working poverty line and sustain higher unemployment, a country in the most radical band spends about three times as the least radical band on social assistance. Essentially this ensures the larger non-working population is fed. This also translates into better social progress and a higher standard of living than the least radical band. While the most radical band generally has a similar government type, government effectiveness, and state fragility as the least radical band, they are becoming more democratic and more fragile. In addition, both rank comparably on political rights, civil liberties, and freedom of the press. The most radical band's higher perception of corruption is warranted because close to nineteen percent of the population paid a bribe last year. This population also views the media as corrupt. The most radical band's governments exert less control over the shadow economy and fewer people voluntarily pay taxes. Finally, and most telling, the most radical band has the fewest barriers to jihad. It is much easier and less costly for a moderate earner in the most radical band to travel and fight.

Meanwhile, with respect to the least radical band and much of the above, the study determined key differences. These countries have higher infant mortality rates, higher adolescent

birth rates, higher adult mortality rates, and have a shorter life expectancy. They are less educated and less literate. Populations in the least radical band are more likely to live in rural areas, participate in the labor market, and be employed in agriculture. The least radical band's GDP is thirteen and a half times higher than the most radical band, yet the population on average is poor; over forty percent live on less than two dollars a day. They have less disposable income at the end of the month and pay more for goods. Unfortunately for the poor, the government spends about the same percentage of GDP as the most radical band on social services, yet relatively little per person in need. This equates to a lower middle ranking for the society to meet basic human needs and a medium level ranking on quality of life. While overall these governments are considered democratic, the least radical band is becoming more autocratic yet less fragile. This could contribute to the populations' view that their government is largely corrupt. Contrary to this perception, they have faith in the press and religious bodies. Their opinion of the government is undeserved due to only about seven percent paying a bribe last year. Additionally, these countries have a smaller shadow economy and higher tax compliance rates. With all this in mind, would be jihadists in the least radical band have to overcome not only the vast distance to fight in a holy war, but lack the resources to fund their travel. It is possible that despite all of the above indicators, the most important factors are finances and flight miles.

When comparing Indonesia to Tunisia, there are a lot of similarities and many of the differences highlighted in the summation above. This study looks directly at these two countries because they have similar: government types, World Governance Indicators, political rights, civil liberties, freedom of the press, Corruption Perception Index score, nominal earnings, disposable income, per capita GDP, consumer price spending, state fragility, social progress, and human development. This makes them comparable in many ways. This being said, they have stark

differences in many areas beyond being geographically different. First of all, Tunisia has vastly higher foreign fighter participation rates. Indonesia has a much larger economy, based on agriculture and natural resources, and a positive GDP growth rate. Indonesia has higher labor participation and employment with greater literacy, education, and female involvement in the work place. Conversely, about 30.9% of college educated Tunisians are out of work compared to 7.7% of Indonesians. Meanwhile, 38.5% of Indonesians live in working poverty with only 3.3% of Tunisians living on less than two dollars a day. This disparity is further exacerbated with Tunisians spending about \$686 per person on social assistance than the \$61 Indonesia does per impoverished person. This also highlights the Indonesian travel barrier to jihad. They must travel over 5,800 miles to get to Turkey and then infiltrate into Iraq and Syria where Tunisians only have to travel just over 1,000 miles. Ultimately, Indonesia's much larger economy allows it to spend more on other government functions, especially security. Indonesia spends \$6.9 billion compared to Tunisia's \$922 million on their militaries.⁹² Ultimately these two countries are very similar yet certain conditions allow Tunisians to more freely exercise violent Muslim radical tendencies. Lacking local grievances and larger security apparatus probably explains why groups like Jemaah Islamiya, Jemaah Ansharut Tauhid, and Mujahidin Indonesia Timur have not thrived beyond their localized areas.⁹³ The dearth of local extremist groups in Tunisia, beyond regional groups like ISIS, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, and Ansar al-Shari'a in Tunisia, are likely explained by the

⁹² *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database* [database online], Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, accessed December 1, 2016, <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.

⁹³ *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015*, 68-69, 318.

relative freedom to fight in Iraq and Syria and export of radical individuals.⁹⁴ Cash-strapped radical Indonesians probably cannot afford to travel to fight and have few, viable local opportunities.

Conclusion

This study set out to identify the secular reasons a country like Indonesia does not contribute more to violent Muslim radical groups. Many of the deductions are summarized in the previous section. Large amounts of data from numerous indices and databases were used; many have been excluded from this presentation due to lack of correlation or scope. This study could easily be expanded to include even more data, especially with access to unique datasets used by local governments. This study raises additional questions that may require comparing two countries directly in a more nuanced manner; such as Indonesia and Tunisia.

Indonesia does not suffer from the same radical violence that many other developing countries endure. Its secular government, culture, and peculiar form of Islam contribute to the lack of extremist groups. Organizations like the NU, will continue to be a moderating function in the country. While outside the government purview, it prevents violent Muslim radical groups from emerging. As a developing nation, Indonesia struggles with state security and government expansion while dealing with high poverty rates. The difficulties faced by a rising democracy is described by the Ian Bremmer's *The J Curve*.⁹⁵ Fortunately, Indonesia has shown greater resilience and increased stability. As the nation's GDP continues to rise, it will have to seek intelligent ways to invest in its population while maintaining its pluralism and preventing radicalization.

⁹⁴ *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2015*, 216-217.

⁹⁵ Ian Bremmer, *The J Curve*.

It is possible that as its citizenry become richer, they will have the resources to participate in jihad. One potential is that by the time Indonesia pulls its destitute out of poverty, radical magnets like Iraq and Syria will have disappeared. Despite the lack of correlation of democracy and absence of radicalization, Indonesia has kept radicalism at bay through good governance, adequate security, and geography. Public funding of groups like NU could delegitimize them and make them less effective at stemming extremist thought. Indonesia's government should continue to strive to be pluralistic and secular. Mass protests against a non-Muslim official, who was overwhelming elected to be the governor of Jakarta, will test this inclination.⁹⁶

Ultimately, Indonesia is less radical for both secular and non-secular reasons. Organizations like the NU are important, but the remoteness to the Iraq and Syria conflicts and lack of disposable income presents challenging barriers. When 38.5% of the population lives in working poverty, a would be radical does not have the time to participate in violent Muslim radical groups. While many feel for the less fortunate caught in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and ISIS savagery, these events are distant and do not overtake immediate survival needs. If Indonesia was physically closer to one of these conflicts, it is possible that removing such a barrier would increase their participation in violent Muslim radical groups.

One unhappy method would be to gradually let the unfortunate slowly rise out of poverty without increasing social assistance. Tunisia is a possible example of a country with higher social welfare, high unemployment, and high rates of foreign fighter participation. Indonesia will also

⁹⁶ "Police name Jakarta's ethnic Chinese governor a blasphemy suspect, order him not to leave country," *South China Morning Post*, November 16, 2016, accessed December 1, 2016, <http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2046495/jakartas-ethnic-chinese-governor-ahok-named-suspect>.

have to look at its agrarian economy as it modernizes. Countries in the most radical band were more focused on services. Agriculture in developing countries require a large labor pool; this keeps would-be radicals in the fields and out of universities where the intelligentsia recruit.

The Indonesian government is legitimately concerned about returning foreign fighters. These jihadists will bring back experience and technical skills that will challenge the security forces' hard won stability. The country will continue to struggle with balancing security needs, its tenuous democracy, and civil liberties during this period.

Finally, if there are large numbers of radicals in Indonesia, they are stymied by their lack of local opportunities, distance to Turkey and Saudi Arabia, and financial standing. An effective secular government, albeit with perceived corruption, enjoys a large economy to support its civic and security functions. The high rate of college graduate employment and high participation in labor-intensive agriculture prevents the educated and impoverished class from having the free time to participate in violent Muslim radical groups. In the future, Indonesia will have to seek equilibrium as it develops its society while maintaining its unique culture of "tropical Islam."⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Kaplan, *Monsoon*, 241.

Appendix

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